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DRAFTING THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGE CLAUSE-
WHEN AND HOW
FRANK C. DUNBAR, JR.*
Your client is selling his home for $25,000. He proposes that the
contract of sale call for a "down payment" of $1,000, and that it
stipulate the forfeiture of this sum if the buyer fails to consummate the
purchase by paying the balance of the purchase price within the agreed
twenty days. Will the provision be valid? In what words should it be
expressed? Will the answer to the first question be different if the
amount of the "down payment," and of the stipulated forfeiture, is
$10,000 instead of $1,000? (Answer: Yes, probably, as we shall see
later.)
The same questions arise when the proposal is that the parties
stipulate that a specified sum shall be paid by the contractor for each
day after a specified date that construction is delayed.
Provisions for liquidated damages are quite common in construction
contracts for breach of time-of-completion covenants. Even more fre-
quently, they are used in contracts for the purchase and sale of real
property and of personal property. In the latter, they are usually ex-
pressed as provisions for forfeiture of earnest money, without being
categorized as agreements to liquidate damages. Other possible uses are
myriad.
In all cases, before determining whether to draft and how to draft
a provision for liquidated damages, the draftsman must know when they
are valid. To know that, he must know what tests the courts apply in
making their determinations. He must know what his client's position
will be if such a provision is held unenforceable. He should know
whether such provisions are more likely to be upheld when they apply
to the breach of a particular type of covenant than when they apply to
the breach of another type. He should know whether, if the provision
is tested in the judicial crucible, a satisfactory result will be more likely
if the provision is expressly characterized as one for liquidated damages.
He should consider whether to incorporate recitals of the parties' in-
tentions, of the possible adverse impact upon the promisee of a breach,
and of the fact that ascertaining the amount of damages will be difficult.
Finally-and of great practical importance-if the bargain has not
been finally negotiated, what will be the "price" impact of the provision?
It is beyond the scope of this article to set forth a detailed analysis
and documentation of the substantive law on this subject.' Our primary
*Of the firm of Dunbar, Kienzle and Murphey; member of the Ohio Bar.
1 See, generally, the works of writers on contracts and damages, such as
CORBIN, CONTRACTS (1950). See also, 25 C.J.S. Damages §§ 101-16 (1941).
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purpose is rather to determine and assemble some of the precepts for the
draftsman that may be drawn from the legal literature on the subject.
They will follow. However, since the legal guideposts and warning
signals must be firmly in mind when one drafts in this area, a summary
of the relevant law is essential.
VALIDITY OF PROVISION-PENALTY?
Penalties Are Not Enforceable
Subject to some limitations, bona fide agreements between con-
tracting parties fixing the amount, or establishing a means of subse-
quently fixing the amount, of the damages to accrue to one party in the
event of a breach of a covenant by the other party are valid and en-
forceable. Within the established limitations, parties are as free to
contract on this matter as any other. However, the courts of all
American jurisdictions will hold invalid and unenforceable covenants
which they characterize as penalties for breach of contract. In fact, in
earlier years, they demonstrated great zeal in "relieving against" such
provisions, tending to resolve doubts in favor of characterizing the pro-
visions as ones for penalties rather than for liquidated damages.2 In more
recent years, however, that tendency seems to be substantially abated,
with increasing recognition that the parties, acting dispassionately before
controversy has arisen between them, are often more competent than
are judges and juries to assess the amount of damages for a particular
breach of a particular covenant, and that encouraging them to do so by
upholding their bargains tends to reduce the strife and expense of
litigation.'
2The history of the growth of the principle that equity will prevent the
enforcement of penalties is set forth briefly at 25 C.J.S. Damages § 101 (c) (1941).
3 "There are, no doubt, decided cases which tend to support the contention
advanced by appellant, but these decisions were, for the most part, rendered at
a time when courts were disposed to look upon such provisions in contracts with
disfavor and to construe them strictly, if not astutely, in order that damages, even
though termed liquidated, might be treated as penalties, so that only such loss as
could be definitely proved could be recovered. The later rule, however, is to look
with candor, if not with favor, upon such provisions in contracts when deliberately
entered into between parties who have equality of opportunity for understanding
and insisting upon their rights, as promoting prompt performance of contracts and
because adjusting in advance, and amicably, matters the settlement of which
through courts would often involve difficulty, uncertainty, delay and expense ...
The parties to the contract, with full understanding of the results of delay and
before differences or interested views had arisen between them, were much more
competent to justly determine what the amount of damage would be, an amount
necessarily largely conjectural and resting in estimate, than a court or jury would
be, directed to a conclusion, as either must be, after the event, by views and
testimony derived from witnesses who would be unusual to a degree if their
conclusion were not, in a measure, colored and partisan." Wise v. United States,
249 U.S. 361, 365-67 (1919). See also 25 C.J.S. Damages § 102(b) (1941).
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The authorities generally distinguish between liquidated damages
as being a genuine pre-estimate of damages, and a penalty as being a
provision which operates in terrorem, by "penalizing for breach," "as
punishment," or as a "deterrent." Absent infrequent statutory limita-
tions, the courts rely upon the two basic tests of validity hereafter de-
scribed, often additionally paying lip service to the "intention of the
parties."
First Test-Reasonableness of Amount or Formula
The Restatement succinctly encapsules the courts' first test of the
validity of a covenant claimed to be for liquidated damages by saying
that the amount thereby fixed must be "a reasonable forecast of just
compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach. . . ."' In
enunciating this test, courts and writers use terms such as "honest" and
"reasonable" estimates of damages or "attempts at pre-estimation." If
an amount prescribed as purported liquidated damages, by the measure
normally applicable,' is obviously excessive, the courts will characterize
it as a penalty and hold the provision invalid.6 (Questions as to possible
varying degrees of disparateness, who has the burden of showing it, and
the extent to which the courts will indulge rebuttable presumptions of
the reasonableness of the parties' determination are outside the scope of
this writing.)
Is the reasonableness of the amount or formula prescribed to be
judged in the light of the situation as viewed by the parties at the time
they made their contract, or is it to be judged in the light of conditions
existing at the time of or after the breach? While some of the earlier
cases ignored this question, and proceeded to apply the test by hindsight,
when the question has been expressly considered it has nearly always
been held that reasonableness is to be judged as of the time of the
making of the contract.'
Second Test-Difficulty of Ascertaining Damages
Fostered undoubtedly by the historical reluctance of courts to en-
force liquidated-damages covenants, the rule has become firmly estab-
lished that such a covenant is not enforceable unless "the harm that is
caused by the breach is one that is incapable or very difficult of accurate
estimation."'s To illustrate, damages for failure to pay a promised sum
4 REsTATEIMENT, CONTRACTS § 339 (1932).
5 "In determining the amount of this compensation [for breach of contract]
as the 'damages' to be awarded, the aim in view is to put the injured party in as
good a position as he would have had if performance had been rendered as
promised." 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 992 (1951). The general rule is stated at
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 329 (1932).
025 C.J.S. Damages § 108 (1941).7 E.g., Wise v. United States, supra note 3.
8 REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 339 (1932).
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of money when due are measured by the legal rate of interest. A simple
mathematical computation, after breach, will result in a precise ascertain-
ment of the damages. An agreement to liquidate damages for such a
breach is invalid.
A second illustration: If the circumstances are such that a promisee's
compensation for breach of a promise to deliver a specified number of
shares of a stock actively traded upon an exchange would be based upon
the value of that stock at a particular time, that value could be accu-
rately computed, after the breach, by reference to readily available
stock-price quotations. An agreement for liquidated damages in this case
would be invalid. The result should be different, however, if the parties
were to agree that for the purpose of measuring the promisee's damages
in the event of a breach by the promisor the value of the stock of a
closely held corporation, for which no active market exists, is a specified
sum (assuming of course that the sum specified be a reasonable one;
probably meaning, in this case, within the upper and lower limits of a
rational determination of value for the particular stock).
Since the agreement liquidating damages must be reasonable, in the
light of the rules of law for measuring damages, the draftsman of such
an agreement cannot proceed with his drafting until he knows how the
damages for a particular breach of a particular covenant would be
measured in the jurisdiction whose law would control in the event of an
action for recovery of damages.
To what extent is the element of foreseeability of harm from a
specified breach of a particular covenant relevant to drafting an agree-
ment liquidating damages for that ,breach? The answer is that it is
probably no more relevant than in the case of a post-breach ascertain-
ment of allowable damages. Hence, the careful draftsman will seek
to anticipate whether the promisor might subsequently contend that the
parties had not at the time of making their contract foreseen that par-
ticular consequences would flow from the promisor's breach. He can
then incorporate a suitable recital in his contract to make it plain that the
parties did, in fact, foresee particular consequences.
When shall the determination be made as to whether it will be
difficult to ascertain the amount of damages? Since the answer may
establish the validity of the stipulation as of the time of the making of
the contract, that is the time as of which the determination should be
9 "A contract-breaker can be charged with the amount of an expected gain
that his breach has prevented, if when the contract was made he had reason to
foresee that his breach would prevent it from accruing. He can be charged with
an expenditure made in reliance on the contract if he had reason to foresee that
it would be incurred and that his breach would make it futile." 5 Coaanv,
CONTRACrs § 992 (1951). Generally, on the factor of foreseeability, see id.
§§ 1007-10, 1012, 1013.
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made. When the problem has been squarely considered, it has been so
resolved."
Intention of Parties
The opinions of the courts dealing with the validity of covenants
purportedly for liquidated damages are replete with discussions about the
"intention of the parties." Time and again they are found to say that a
covenant specifying a sum to be paid in the event of a breach will be
deemed to be one for liquidated damages if the parties so intended;
otherwise, a penalty. Rarely is there any doubt about what the parties
intended. If the agreement is to the effect that if A fails to perform
as promised he shall pay Y dollars to B, that is what they meant. What
is there to construe? Contracting parties-businessmen, usually-do not
contract in terms of legal doctrines. They have never heard of the
proposition that "equity will relieve against a penalty." When they say
that under specified circumstances one man shall pay another a sum of
money, that is just what they intend.
The courts, however, in vast majority in the past, have proceeded,
in terms of the example above given, first to determine whether Y
dollars was a reasonable amount in relation to the harm done to B by
A's failure to perform his promise. If they have concluded that it was
reasonable, they have solemnly opined that it was the intention of the
parties that Y dollars should be "liquidated damages." If they have
determined that it was not reasonable, they have said, often squarely in
the face of an express declaration that Y dollars is fixed as "liquidated
damages," that the parties intended that the payment of Y dollars should
be a "penalty," serving as a club to compel performance by A.
The true rule surely is that the intention of the parties in this
regard is irrelevant; that the law, as a matter of public policy, imposes
a limitation upon the freedom of the power to contract, and that if a
contractual provision is not within the limitation it is invalid."
Same Liquidated Damages for Several Breaches
When two or more separate obligations are to be performed by
a contracting party, appropriate damages for the breach of one of them
would not ordinarily be the same as for the breach of another. There-
10 "In determining whether the sum provided to be paid in the contract is
liquidated damages, or a penalty, a court will construe the contract by its four
corners in the light of the situation of the parties at the time of the execution of
the contract, and from that position will determine whether the damages which
would be sustained by reason of breach could, by the process of computation and
adjustment, have been easily and approximately ascertained at the time of exe-
cution of the contract. . . ." Miller v. Blockberger, 111 Ohio St. 798, 807, 146 N.E.
206, 209 (1924). To the same effect, see 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1060 (1951).
11 "Intent is of no practical importance. The question is not what the parties
intended, but 'whether the sum is in fact in the nature of a penalty.'" Central
Trust Co. v. Wolf, 255 Mich. 8, 237 N.V. 29, 78 A.L.R. 843 (1931). See 78 A.L.R.
846 (1932).
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fore, a sum as stipulated damages which would meet the test of reason-
ableness as to the breach of one covenant would be unlikely to meet that
test with respect to the breach of another. Generally speaking, there-
fore, a single stipulation with respect to more than one breach will be
held invalid,'" unless, possibly, the provision is determined to be reason-
able as to each one of the designated breaches.' 3
Specific Sum Versus Formula
Will a contractual stipulation be valid if instead of specifying a
definite single sum to be paid by the defaulting party it sets forth a
formula or measure or basis to be used subsequent to the breach in
computing the amount to be paid? Yes, even though an occasional
aberrant decision may be found. 4 Such provisions are frequently used,
and are often eminently satisfactory.
Relevant Statutes
Pertinent statutes applying to liquidated-damages covenants are a
comparative rarity, but the draftsman should always verify their ex-
istence or nonexistence. For example, California and Oklahoma have
provided that liquidated-damages agreements are void except in cases in
which it is impracticable or extremely difficult to ascertain actual
damages.
12 25 CJ.S. Damages § 111 (1941).
13 Ann Arbor Asphalt Constr. Co. v. City of Howell, 226 Mich. 647, 198
N.W. 195 (1924) ; Comment, Functional Approach in Determining the Validity of
a Liquidated Damage Clause, 30 TEx. L. REv. 752, 753 (1952).
14E.g., Midwest Properties Co. v. Renkel, 38 Ohio App. 503, 176 N.E. 665
(1930). The court said: "In the case at bar the provision calls for reasonable
attorney fees, without specifying the amount. It . . . leaves in an uncertain state
the amount that courts and juries will regard as reasonable attorney fees. This
provision cannot be regarded as one of liquidated damages, because the amount is
left uncertain, and still calls for future action by courts and juries to determine
what, in their opinion, are reasonable attorney fees." Id. at 513, 176 N.E. at 669.
The court did not refer to, and presumably was unaware of, the holding of the
Ohio Supreme Court in Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Domestic Science Baking Co.,
95 Ohio St. 180, 115 N.E. 1014 (1917), wherein the court said: "Where the
parties to a contract deem it advisable, the law permits them to stipulate in
advance what the damage, or the measure thereof, shall be in case of breach by
either." (Emphasis added.) The holding in Midwest Properties is contra that of
the United States Supreme Court in Irving Trust Co. v. A. W. Perry, Inc., 293
U.S. 307 (1934), wherein the lease in question provided that the filing of a petition
in bankruptcy by or against the lessee "shall be deemed to constitute a breach of
this lease, and thereupon ipso facto . . . this lease shall become and be terminated;
and the Lessor shall . . . be entitled to recover damages for such breach in an
amount equal to the amount of the rent reserved in this lease for the residue of the
term thereof less the fair rental value of the premises for the residue of the term."
Mr. Justice Roberts, for the Court, concurred in the circuit court's view that "the
clause provided a reasonable formula for ascertaining the damages of the land-
lord, did not smack of a penalty, and was therefore enforceable."
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Statutes providing for the awarding of public contracts by com-
petitive bidding often require that bidders deposit a sum of money which
shall be forfeited under specified conditions, such as that, if the depositor
be awarded the contract, he thereafter fails within a time limited to
sign a formal written contract and secure its performance. 5 Such re-
quirements are apparently well-nigh universally upheld, often without
any consideration of the question whether they constitute requirements
for the payment of liquidated damages or provisions for penalty. Per-
haps the question is irrelevant in such a case on the theory that the
legislature has established an exception to the general public-policy rule
which applies in the case of private contracts; that is, that the legislature
has declared a different public policy to prevail in relation to such public
contracts. In some cases the courts will characterize the forfeiture of
the bidder's security as being in the nature of liquidated damages.' 6
Statutes relating to public contracts may provide for relief against
the usual consequences of a liquidated-damages stipulation.'
Consequences of Invalidity
If a provision specifying a payment by the promisee upon breach
of his covenant is held to be invalid as constituting a penalty, the legal
effect is as though it were expunged from the contract. The validity
of the remainder of the contract is not impaired. In the event of breach
the promisor may recover whatever damages he would be entitled to
under the law if the provision had not been incorporated in the contract.' s
CHARACTERIZING AGREEMENT AS ONE FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
What is the effect of a statement in a contract that a stipulated
sum shall be paid "as damages" or "as liquidated damages" or "as com-
pensation for the resulting damage"? It was observed above that the
intention of the parties in this regard, as indicated by such expressions,
is, or at least should properly be regarded as, irrelevant to the issue of
validity of the agreement. The ultimate characterization of the nature
of the promised payment will, in the event of dispute, be by the court,
irrespective of the parties' characterization.
When the provision is one that will be enforced by the court, the
amount specified therein is called liquidated damages. In cases where
enforcement is denied, it is said that the parties have provided for a
penalty or a forfeiture.' 9
In this posture of the law, should the draftsman characterize his
stipulated payment in such terms "as liquidated damages," or "as dam-
15 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 731.15 (1953).
16 E.g., Village of Pomeroy v. Ringwald, 13 Ohio App. 367, 31 Ohio C.C.R.
(n.s.) 444 (Ct. App. 1920).
1 7 E.g., 41 U.S.C. § 256a (1950).
18 See cases cited at 25 C.J.S. Damages § 116(b) n.87 (1941).
19 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1058 (1951).
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ages and not as a penalty"? The answer is yes. It can do no harm,
and may possibly be helpful.2" One reason is that it may give a court
which is already disposed to uphold the provision an additional peg upon
which to hang its decision. Mr. Justice Clarke, speaking for the United
States Supreme Court in upholding a contractual stipulation of damages,
pointed out that "the parties specifically state that the amount agreed
upon as liquidated damages had been 'computed, estimated and agreed
upon' between them."'" If a court construing the provision should be
one that pays lip service to the "intention of the parties" test, the presence
of an appropriate characterization may make it easier for it to render a
favorable decision.
Generally in a jury trial, the question whether an agreement to
pay a stipulated sum is one for liquidated damages or in the nature of
a penalty is held to be one for the court; however, in some jurisdictions
it is held to be one of fact for the jury.22 If a contract should come
before a court in such a jurisdiction, the characterization by the parties
might be persuasive to the jury.
INTEREST ON LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
In most jurisdictions interest on damages for breach of contract
is allowed from the date when payment was due if the demand sued
upon was liquidated.2" Conversely, it is ordinarily not allowed for the
period prior to judgment upon claims for unliquidated damages.24 In
the event of breach and necessity of suit to collect damages, will a
covenant for liquidated damages enlarge the plaintiff's recovery by in-
terest between date of breach or demand and judgment date? (With
a lapse of sometimes several years between filing of suit and rendition
of judgment, this could substantially increase the aggrieved party's re-
covery.) On principle, the answer should be yes.25  And it has been
so held,26 although there is authority to the contrary.
20 25 C.J.S. Damages § 105 (1941).
2 1 Wise v. United States, 249 U.S. 361, 366 (1919).
22 25 C.J.S. Damages § 102(a) (1941).
23 25 C.J.S. Damages §§ 51, 52 (1941).
2 4 Id. § 52.
25 "In all jurisdictions, simple interest at the statutory legal rate is recover-
able as damages for non-payment of a liquidated debt from the date of breach if
the parties involved have not themselves provided otherwise by contract. As used
in this connection, the term 'liquidated debt' has a much broader signification than
it is frequently given in other places. It includes not only all legal duties to pay a
definite and undisputed amount of money; it includes also a duty to render any
performance the value of which in money is stated in the contract itself. If
damages that would have been too uncertain in amount have been liquidated at a
certain amount by agreement, interest is recoverable from the date when that
amount was payable." 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1046 (1951).
2625 C.J.S. Damages § 116(a) n.76 (1941).
27 Id. n.77.
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ACTUAL DAMAGES REQUIRED?
Must a plaintiff suing on a covenant for liquidated damages prove
not merely the breach but also that he has actually been damaged, in
order to prevail? The majority rule appears to be that he need not
prove actual damage.2" In one state, it has been held that in a case in
which the obligee shows no injury he can recover the stipulated sum as
liquidated damages only if there was a further agreement that the sum
was to be paid regardless of injury. Some states take the approach that
there is a presumption of law that a breach results in damages, and that
for a prima facie case the plaintiff need not prove either that he sus-
tained actual damage, or that if he did the amount thereof was sub-
stantial and not merely nominal, but that if it is made affirmatively to
appear that the plaintiff sustained no damages the provision for liquidated
damages cannot be enforced.2 9
Some courts not following the majority rule apparently do not even
recognize the question in the terms above stated. If there be no actual
damage sustained, the provision will be deemed one for a penalty,
rather than liquidated damages.30
OTHER PROBLEMS ARISING AFTER AGREEMENT MADE
Above we considered briefly the question of the necessity of proving
actual damage in order to recover under an agreement liquidating
damages. Ve did so because it points up the fact that, in many juris-
dictions, an enormous practical advantage of such an agreement may
be to simplify or eliminate problems of proof if the promisee must sue
on his contract. Also, drafting suggestions are implicit.
Numerous other types of problems can arise during operations
under a contract carrying a stipulation for liquidated damages, or after
breach. Especially is this the case under construction contracts pro-
viding for liquidated damages in the event of delay in completion of
work. For example, the question often arises as to the effect upon the
promisee's right to recover liquidated damages for delays occasioned by
him or a third person." Alterations and additions performed at his
instance may or may not have required more time in construction.
Sometimes the acts of both parties contribute to delays, and in such case
questions of apportionment may arise. Such contracts sometimes contain
provisions for time extensions under stipulated circumstances. What is
the effect of a complete abandonment of the work by the contractor,
so that in effect his delay in completion will extend, in perpetuity?
2 8 Annot., 34 A.L.R. 1336, 1341 (1925); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 115(d) (1941).
2925 C.J.S. Damages § 115(d) (1941).
3o Dunn v. Morgenthau, 73 App. Div. 147, 76 N.Y. Supp. 827 (1902), aff'd
175 N.Y. 518, 67 N.E. 1081 (1903). See Annot., 34 A.L.R. 1336, 1338 (1925).
31 See Annot., 152 A.L.R. 1349 (1944).
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The reader's attention is directed to these problems, but because
they are largely collateral to the subject of this article, and because
another writer has recently addressed himself specifically to them,"2
they will not be examined here.
GUISES AND DISGUISES
As a general rule, any contractual arrangement whereunder a
promisee is to receive a specified sum of money, or a sum of money to
be computed in some specified manner, must meet the tests for a valid
agreement liquidating damages, else it will be held invalid as providing
a penalty. The obvious case is that of an agreement by the promisee to
pay a sum of money to the promisor after the promisee's default.
A somewhat less obvious, but very common, case is that whereunder a
purchaser of property pays earnest money to the seller, with the stipu-
lation that if the purchaser fails to consummate the purchase by paying
the balance of the purchase price within a stipulated time the earnest-
money payment shall be forfeit. Commonly, such contracts do not
characterize the forfeiture as being in the nature of liquidated damages,
but the amount of it must meet the test of reasonableness and the
circumstances must be such that the damages from the breach would
be at least difficult accurately to determine; otherwise the forfeiture
will be judicially stricken down. The rule is not changed by the inter-
vention of a third party as a stakeholder in such a case.
A provision may be for the forfeiture of property other than
money.
33
Contracting parties' lawyers have been ingenious and occasionally
ingenuous in cloaking penalty provisions in other forms, sometimes with
success in the courts. For example, in one type of case, in which the
promisor's obligation is simply to pay a specified sum of money at a
specified time, without interest if so paid, the instrument further pro-
vides that if payment is not made when due, then interest shall be paid
at a specified (nonusurious) rate from the inception of the obligation
and not merely from the due date. Under one line of cases such a
stipulation will be stricken as imposing a penalty-that is, the interest
from inception to due date-based on the rule that the only measure of
damages for the withholding of money is interest commencing at the
time payment is due is withheld; but under another line of cases such
provisions are enforced as constituting valid agreements to liquidate
damages. 4 Comparable problems, with varying results in the cases, are
presented by stipulations for a higher rate of interest after maturity,
32 Anderson, Liquidated Damage Problems in Construction Contracts, 5 PRAc.
LAW. 72 (1959).
33 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1057 (1951).
3 4 Annot., 12 A.L.R. 367, 374 (1921).
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for a higher rate of interest after default in paying interest, and for a
higher rate of interest retroactively from inception in cases of default.3 5
The validity of provisions in bills and notes for the payment of
the holders' attorney fees and other costs of collecting is determined
on the basis of the tests for valid liquidated-damages stipulations, with
varying results in different jurisdictions. a6
Other variants from expressly labelled stipulations for liquidated
damages or penalties are frequent. One arrangement is to provide that
a specified sum shall be paid for performance by a stipulated date, and
a greater sum for performance by an earlier date. If the differences in
time and sums payable are reasonable, the arrangement will usually be
upheld upon the theory either of reasonable liquidated damages for
failure to complete by the earlier date, or of a payment of a premium
price for a better bargain. However, if the price disparity is great in
relation to total contract price, so that it appears that the parties' real
objective was that performance should be rendered by the earlier date,
the difference between the alternative prices is likely to be held to be a
penalty.
The same basic tests are applied in determining the validity of
alternative covenants that purport to give the contracting party the
choice of paying a sum of money or of rendering some specified other
performance.
3 7
ADVANTAGES OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISIONS
We are now in a position to catalog some of the advantages which
may accrue to one or both of the parties to a contract from the inclusion
of stipulations for liquidated damages for one or more specified breaches.
(1) Often the determination of the amount of damages to be
awarded for a breach of contract involves much expense and difficulty
during the course of, and in preparation for, the litigation thereon.
These are avoided or reduced substantially.
(2) In some jurisdictions, a stipulation may assure recovery when
it would be difficult or impossible for the promisee to prove that he
sustained actual damage or, if so proven, that the damage was substantial.
(3) In most of the cases and jurisdictions, inclusion will assure
the plaintiff's right to recover interest from the date of breach or de-
mand, rather than merely from the date of judgment.
(4) Other benefits may flow from the fact that the amount of
the damages is liquidated earlier in point of time than the rendition of
judgment. For example, in one case it made the claim for damages
provable in bankruptcy, when otherwise it would not have been.3 8
38Annot.,12 A.L.R. 367,369,372 (1921); 25 C.J..S. Damages § 113(b) (1941).
36 7 Ami. JurL Bills and Notes §§ 138-42 (1937).
3725 C.J.S. Damages § 110(d) (1941).
38 Irving Trust Co. v. A. W. Perry, Inc., 293 U.S. 307 (1934).
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(5) From the standpoint of the party who promises to pay liqui-
dated damages, while the provision may make it more certain that he
will have to pay in the event of his breach, a valid provision establishes
a firm maximum limit upon the amount of his obligation.
(6) The promisee under such a provision has some practical as-
surance, from the very fact of its incorporation in the contract, that
the other party realizes that his default will be costly to him, thus
having some of the deterrent effect of a penalty. This is especially likely
to be the case if there have been substantial negotiations over the pro-
vision, for then the prospective defaulter will have the provision firmly
in mind.
WHEN TO USE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISIONS IN CONTRACTS
The use of such a provision should be considered in any situation in
which it appears likely at the time the contract is drawn that it would
be difficult, after a breach, to ascertain the amount of damages. It
should especially be considered in any situation in which any of the
advantages above enumerated might be present.
From the standpoint of either party the use of the provision might
achieve what is surely always a basic purpose, that is, to eliminate or
reduce the time and expense of litigation over damages.
The draftsman should ordinarily not refrain from using the pro-
vision in an otherwise suitable case just because the contract is entered
into in a jurisdiction in which the particular provision might be un-
enforceable. In most cases it will be possible, and in many will be likely,
that an action on the contract would be brought in some other juris-
diction where the provision would be enforceable. (Problems of conflicts
of laws will not be considered here. For current purposes it is enough
to assume that situations will sometimes exist under which the law of
some jurisdiction other than that in which the contract is entered into
will control for the purpose of an adjudication on the validity of a
liquidated-damages provision.) A simple illustration may be given. In
Ohio a stipulation in a promissory note for the payment of the holder's
attorney fees, if the note be not paid at maturity, is held to be void as
contrary to public policy,39 although Section 2 of the Uniform Negoti-
able Instruments Law,40 prevents such a stipulation from destroying the
negotiable character of an instrument.41 However, such stipulations are
enforceable in various other jurisdictions.4" It is entirely possible, espe-
cially in the case of a note made in Ohio but delivered or payable, or
39 Miller v. Kyle, 85 Ohio St. 186, 97 N.E. 372 (1911).
40 OHIo REv. CODE § 1301.06 (1953).
41 Miller v. Kyle, 85 Ohio St. 186, 97 N.E. 372 (1911).
42 7 AM. JUR. Bills and Notes §§ 138-42 (1937).
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both, in another state, that an action to collect on the note would be
prosecuted in some other state.
Practical considerations may be far more important, in many cases,
than purely legal considerations, in determining whether a liquidated-
damages provision should be used. The psychological impact upon the
potential defaulter of discussions during negotiation about the amount
of damages that might result from his default may substantially diminish
the likelihood that he will breach his contract. Undoubtedly, many lay-
men are unaware of the legal consequences of failing to keep their
bargains, and anything that tends to drive home an understanding that
those consequences can be serious may tend to make them strive harder
not to fail.
Counsel should be alert, no matter which party he represents.
Occasions can arise in which it may be greatly to the interest of the
party who is the potential payor of damages to insist upon the inclusion
of a damages-liquidating clause in his contract. Such an occasion will
exist when (1) there is substantial danger that the party may not be
able to avoid breaching his promise and (2) the situation is such that the
damages to the other party might be very large. At the contract-
negotiating stage, the other party may be willing to stipulate damages
at a reasonable, bearable level.
Just as there are some situations in which it is highly advantageous
to one party or the other, or to both, to incorporate one or more pro-
visions for liquidated damages in their contract, so there are other
circumstances in which such incorporation may ,be either in vain or,
from the standpoint of at least one of the parties, unwise. What are
(to borrow the physicians' term) some of the contraindications? Most
obviously, such a provision should not be used in a case in which it will
be invalid because the determination of damages after the breach will be
simple and easy. There is a danger in using the provision in a case in
which the validity of the provision is subject to considerable doubt-a
borderline case-because in that circumstance, instead of reducing the
time and expense of potential litigation, it is likely to induce litigation,
or to introduce new problems in any litigation that might otherwise
ensue.
Purely practical considerations may dictate the nonuse of the pro-
vision in a case in which it would, from a legal standpoint, be apparently
desirable to use it. For example, a few years ago a public agency was
in the course of taking bids, over a period of months, upon a series of
large construction contracts. When bids were received upon some of
the first of these contracts there were indications that many of the
bidders might be, and probably were, increasing the amounts of their
bids substantially because of the presence in the contracts of provisions
for the payment by the contractors of liquidated damages in the event
of noncompletion of construction by specified dates. The public agency
involved concluded that it would have to pay too high a price for the
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benefits that it might derive from these provisions, and in contracts sub-
sequently let these provisions were omitted.
This problem of the "price" to be paid by the promisee under a
stipulation for liquidated damages for breach of contract is one that
may arise with respect to almost any type of contract, whether or not
negotiated between private parties. It has been the writer's observation
that in situations in which the use of such provisions is quite customary,
little has to be "paid" by the promisee to obtain the benefits of such a
provision, while in circumstances in which no prevailing custom exists
much more resistance may be encountered, with consequent demand by
the promisor of an additional quid pro quo.
There are dangers in a draftsman's too offhandedly fixing an
amount or prescribing a formula, without adequate consideration of the
potential consequences of a breach. There is a legal danger, for in such
case the possibility is increased that the amount or formula will be held
not to meet the reasonableness test. There is the practical danger, if the
draftsman represents the beneficiary of a promise to pay liquidated
damages, that he will overlook possible consequences of breach, and
establish an inadequate figure or formula which will later, upon breach,
result in his client's obtaining a wholly inadequate recovery, and one
much less than he might have obtained had there been no stipulation
liquidating damages.
In many situations the legal draftsman cannot afford to utilize an
otherwise desirable provision in an instrument if there is any doubt
whatsoever about its validity, because the consequences to his client might
be too severe if the provision were ultimately held invalid; not so, in
the case of a contractual stipulation for liquidated damages. Here he
can proceed serenely, knowing, as previously indicated, that if the pro-
vision is some day held invalid his client will be no worse off (except for
the added time and expense of the litigation producing the adjudication
of invalidity) than he would have been had the provision been omitted.
SPECIFIC DRAFTING SUGGESTIONS
What precepts for the draftsman may we glean from prior experi-
ence with liquidated-damages stipulations in contracts? Some of them
will be arrayed in the form of lists of things which the draftsman
should do and things which he should not do.
Do's
The draftsman should:
(1) Make sure that the damages stipulated will fall within the
range between the upper and lower limits of potential actual damages
foreseeable at the time of the making of the contract. Otherwise, the
provision is likely to be held to be invalid as prescribing a penalty.
(2) See to it that the parties actually, seriously negotiate on the
question of the amount or measure of the liquidated damages, with full
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consideration of all foreseeable consequences of breach. Then, for
added protection, incorporate in the contract recitals which will show
that they have done so.
(3) If the contemplated breach is of a covenant which requires
the party to perform a particular act within a time limit, provide suitable
machinery for reasonable extensions to adjust for delays which may re-
sult from actions or derelictions of the other party or of third parties.
Especially do so in construction contracts.
(4) Make the amount of damages agreed upon vary with the ex-
tent of the breach, such as the duration of the delay or period of
default.4 3
(5) Incorporate a suitable recital indicating that it was the in-
tention of the parties to provide for liquidated damages; at least, charac-
terize by using the words "liquidated damages." Before some courts,
it may help.
(6) Recite the facts which caused the parties to incorporate the
provision in the contract, such as that, for stated reasons, the amount of
damages upon the breach will be very difficult to ascertain with
precision. 44
(7) Consider incorporating factual recitals which can, in the event
of a lawsuit, be pointed to in order to show that the breaching party
had knowledge that specific types of substantial injuries would or might
be sustained by the other party from the former's breach. (This can
be "good medicine" in many contracts, with or without liquidated-
damages provisions.)
(8) If a situation is otherwise one calling for a liquidated-damages
clause, but it is not feasible at the time of drawing the contract to de-
velop a satisfactory, reasonable, and equitable single sum to be paid,
consider specifying a measure or formula by which damages can subse-
quently be computed.
(9) In the case of a construction contract providing for liquidated
damages for delay in completion, consider adding a provision that the
right to liquidated damages shall survive the contractor's complete
abandonment of the work, and its completion by the owner.4 5
Don'ts
Along with the do's, some don'ts are equally important to the
draftsman:
43 See 25 CJ.S. Damages § 112 (1941).
4 4 1d. § 107.
45 It may be desirable to be even more precise by establishing, in the case of
damages-per-day-of-delay provisions, a maximum number of days to which it shall
apply after a complete abandonment of the work. The problem of abandonment,
and other problems arising in connection with construction contracts, are dealt
with in Anderson, Liquidated Damage Problems in Construction Contracts, 5 PRAc.
LAW. 72 (1959).
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(1) Don't lightly approach, or permit the parties lightly to ap-
proach, the determination of the amount of the liquidated damages, or
the formula for fixing them. The result may be fatal.4"
(2) Don't put in too small an amount when representing the
party in whose favor the liquidated-damages provision runs. If it is valid,
that is all he will ever get even though it turns out that the damages
actually sustained and provable are much greater.
(3) Don't use words smacking of penalty. Certainly, don't use
"penalty" or "penalize." To play safe, it may be better to avoid
"forfeit" and -forfeiture;" they may have a connotation in some
judicial minds that would be detrimental. Occasionally, judges have
used "penalty" and "forfeiture" synonymously. (Say, instead, for ex-
ample, that "if B breaches, A shall retain the sum aforesaid, and B
shall have no right to its return.")
(4) Don't provide a single, lump sum as damages for delay, irre-
spective of the duration of the delay.
(5) Don't provide a single sum or measure of damages for
breaches of two or more covenants; treat each potential breach sepa-
rately, if more than one is to be provided for.
(6) Don't provide that in addition to a forfeited or other liqui-
dated sum the injured party may recover actual damages or have some
other specified remedy.4"
(7) Don't require any payment because of nonpayment of a sum
of money when due, except interest at the legal rate after default, with-
out ascertaining within what limits, if any, the proposed requirement
will be enforceable in the jurisdiction or jurisdictions wherein enforce-
ment of the obligation might likely be sought.4"
(8) Don't be too hopeful of success in avoiding the fatal "penalty"
stigma by dressing the provision up in some other guise, although some
cases of "discounts," "premiums," "alternative performances," "dual
prices," and the like do pass judicial scrutiny. In a few instances, that
may be because no "penalty" issue is raised. However, in most which
do succeed, the reason is that the differences between the variants meet
the reasonableness test and thus qualify as valid, liquidated damages
although not so labelled.
40 "[Wlhere it is apparent from the contract itself and the situation of the
parties thereto that the sum stipulated was arrived at arbitrarily, and bears no
relationship to the damage which probably would result from a breach, where
such damage is reasonably ascertainable, the sum stipulated as damages will be
considered a penalty and not liquidated damages ... " Miller v. Blockberger,
111 Ohio St. 798, 809, 146 N.E. 206, 209 (1924).
47 Hughes Bros. v. United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 517 (1910).
48 Annot., 12 A.L.R. 367 (1921).
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